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Abstract:  We discuss the definition of empathy provided by Kujala (2017) and argue that research 
in this field, in assigning the cognitive component of empathy only a secondary role, misses crucial 
information. Further knowledge about dogs’ ability for higher cognitive processes helps (a) in 
interpreting results such as potential prosocial behavior in dogs and (b) sheds light on the question 
of whether abilities like perspective-taking and self-other distinction are uniquely human.  
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Empathy is a cornerstone of social interaction and a crucial component of emotional experience 
in humans. Providing a more decisive answer as to whether empathy should be considered a 
uniquely human skill is hindered by a lack of conceptual clarity, universally accepted definitions, 
and a sense of what processes constitute empathy (cf. Batson, 2009; Bernhardt & Singer, 2012). 
This is true in social psychological and neuroscience research on humans, but also in comparative 
and non-human animal research. Definitions of empathy in non-human animal research are often 
limited to automatic, affective, bottom-up processes such as emotional contagion (Pérez-
Manrique & Gomila, 2017; Silva & de Sousa, 2011), whereas in humans empathy is often defined 
as a multi-faceted phenomenon derived from the interplay of bottom-up and top-down processes 
(Decety & Jackson, 2004), including a host of cognitive processes. In her target article, Kujala 
(2017) provides a well-balanced and substantive review of social cognition in general and 
Animal Sentience 2017.082:  Boch & Lamm on Kujala on Canine Emotions 
2 
specifically empathic-like responses and behaviors in dogs, pointing out the need for future 
research on related topics in cognition, such as theory of mind in dogs. We would like to 
complement her efforts, putting further emphasis on the importance of additional cognitive 
components of empathy in order to better understand whether dogs experience “full-blown” 
empathy or only precursors of it.  
 
1. Defining empathy and its constituents 
 
Before making our point on how cognitive considerations can add to our understanding of the 
affective components of empathy, we would like to briefly recap the definition(s) of empathy in 
the human literature. 
 
1.1. Affect sharing and the self-other distinction  
The ability to share another individual’s feeling is certainly crucial for empathy. However, most 
models of empathy, at least in the human literature, stress that affect sharing is only one 
component. It is also important that the individual who is sharing the other’s affect is able to 
distinguish between self and other, that is, that they know that the other person is the source of 
their own affective state (De Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Yamamoto, 2017). This leads to the 
question of whether cognitive or affective processes alone can generate a multi-faceted 
phenomenon such as empathy or whether it is their interplay that generates the full-blown 
experience of empathy. In other words, can someone, in our case, a dog, experience empathy and 
as a result act to help or comfort another individual without having (some form of) awareness of 
the difference between self and other? 
 
1.2. Empathy and emotional contagion  
To address this question, the concept of emotional contagion must be disentangled from 
empathy. Kujala divides emotional empathy into either emotional-contagion/self-distress or 
empathic concern. This accords with the empathy model of de Waal & Preston (2017), with 
emotional contagion as an automatic affective response matching the affective state of another 
individual (see also Preston & de Waal, 2001). We (Singer & Lamm, 2009) have suggested a 
distinction between emotional contagion and empathy, the latter comprised of bottom-up and 
top-down processes such as cognitive appraisal instead of only simple automatic processes 
(Lamm & Majdandžić, 2015). Emotional contagion lacks the self-other distinction. It can thus lead 
to personal distress because there is no top-down process to correctly assign the affective 
response (to the other) or to regulate it. However, both phenomena, emotional contagion and 
empathy, are equally interesting for comparative research. To better understand their 
relationship, they should be categorized and investigated as distinct phenomena in a process 
model. Despite the advantages of self-report and introspection offered by human research, 
differentiating between empathy and other related phenomena is still very challenging even in 
humans (Batson, 2009; Lamm, Rütgen, & Wagner, 2017). It is hence expected that it is even more 
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2. Why cognitive aspects of empathy matter 
 
The question we raised in the beginning was: “Can someone, in our case, a dog, experience 
empathy and as a result act to help or comfort another individual without having (some form of) 
awareness of the difference between self and other?” Our tentative answer would be that 
empathy-like behavior can be observed whether or not the individual has self-awareness but the 
underlying processes and motives are different. Kujala addresses the difficulty of differentiating 
between actual prosocial or empathic responses and behavior aimed at stress reduction. The 
former could result from an interplay of both top-down and bottom-up processes, whereas the 
latter might originate from a behavioral response to automatic affective processes that are 
“selfishly motivated.” (This has been extensively shown in social psychological and neuroscientific 
research attempting to determine whether prosocial behavior is “truly” altruistic, or just results 
from the selfish motive to reduce one’s own distress; Batson, 2011; Lamm et al., 2017; Lamm, 
Batson, & Decety, 2007). Investigating the cognitive abilities of dogs would enable us to move 
from automatic bottom-up processes to higher-level cognition, clarifying which components or 
processes of empathy (as defined in humans) dogs might also possess (and whether, or to what 
extent, empathy is uniquely human). More knowledge about the processes underlying empathy-
like responses can help us move beyond anthropomorphic projections. Weiss, Inoue-Murayama, 
King, Adams, & Matsuzawa (2012), for example, describe how an anthropomorphic interpretation 
does not need to be the only one in personality research on non-human primates. 
Expanding the definition of empathy in non-human animal research from affective to 
cognitive processes comes with several advantages. First, as argued in the previous section, the 
ability to take another individual’s perspective is the crucial difference between simply catching 
another individual’s affective state and being aware of and understanding their emotional state. 
This can shed new light on the motives underlying empathy-like behavior in dogs and the function 
of their affective abilities, which in turn leads to the question of whether higher cognitive 
processes are solely human or the existence of similar abilities in dogs might be the reason for 
the development of the unique relationship between dogs and humans. 
A shared understanding of empathy across research traditions, sub-disciplines and 
approaches will also facilitate comparative research. We accordingly second Kujala’s call for more 
research in the fields studying theory of mind and related concepts such as perspective-taking but 
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